SAA09FY02-017

AUG 27 1998

Critical Item:

Swing Reducer

Total Quantity:

Find Number:

RA2

Criticality Category:

SAA No:

09FY02-017

System/Aroa:

Condor 86 Aprial Work Platform/

KSG

NASA

PMN/

K60-1015/

Part No: None Name:

Conder 86 Asrial Work Platform

Mfq/

Calavar/

Drawing/

80618/

Part No:

32762

Sheet No:

1

Function: Rotates the turret. Worm input gear powered by hydraulic motor that rotates an output planet gear which rotates the turret.

Critical Fallure Mode/Fallure Mode No: Gear disengagement/09FY02-017.001

Fallure Cause: Broken gear teeth, cracked gear case.

Fallure Effect: Possible for the turret to continue to swing. The platform may impact flight hardware causing loss (damage) to a vehicle system. Detection Method: Visual, Time to Effect: Seconds.

ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:

- The swing reducer is designed in accordance with AGMA, AISI and ASTM standards.
- The worm is steel bar with a BHN of 400-450.
- The output geer (worm gear) is Aluminum Bronze with a BHN of 160-192.
- The output shaft is steel bar with a BHN of 270-300.
- The keys are steel bar with a BHN of 260-290.
- The output pinion gear is steel with a BHN of 315-345.

Test

- Operational check of the turnet rotation is performed before use per "Pre-Operations Maintename Mobile Equipment Checklist KSC Form 28-528 or "Startup Procedures" as outlined in the Vendore Operator's Manual,
- OMRS File VI requires annual performance of an operational test.

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Inspection:

 Inspection of the hydraulio system and controls for leaks and integrity is performed before use per "Pre-Operations Maintenance Mobile Equipment Checklist" KSC Form 28-528 or "Startup Procedures" as outlined in the Vendors Operator's Manual.

Falture History:

- Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies, and other failures experienced during ground processing activities can be found in the PRACA database. The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the ortical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

Operational Use:

Correcting Action:

There is no action that can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.

Timetrame:

None.